Abstract
The Queen Elisabeth International Music Competition of Belgium founded in 1937, is among the world’s most prestigious and demanding music competitions. It alternates between cello, piano, violin, and voice and consists of three rounds in which each candidate gives a recital. Each round selects a subset of candidates. This paper presents and analyses the rule for the selection of candidates and its specificities. It shows that the rule does not satisfy many of the classical properties of the literature on the social choice.
Acknowledgments
A.L. acknowledges the support of the Departamento de Educación, Polí tica Lingüística y Cultura from the Basque Government (Research Group IT1367-19). This work has also benefited from comments by a number of conference and seminar participants.
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Competing interests: The author has no relevant financial or non-financial interests to disclose directly or indirectly related to the work submitted. Thus, there are no competing interests to declare that are relevant to the content of this article.
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Data availability: We do not analyse or generate any datasets, because our work proceeds within a theoretical and mathematical approach.
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© 2025 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- A Comment on the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem
- Queen Elisabeth Competition: A Social Choice Approach
- Credibly Confidential Contracts
- Educational Signaling in Two Different Education Systems
- Privacy and Personalization in a Dynamic Model
- Network Investments Under Different Consumer Expectations and Competition Modes
- Pricing and Selection of Second-Degree Price Discrimination Menus
Articles in the same Issue
- Frontmatter
- Research Articles
- A Comment on the Gibbard–Satterthwaite Theorem
- Queen Elisabeth Competition: A Social Choice Approach
- Credibly Confidential Contracts
- Educational Signaling in Two Different Education Systems
- Privacy and Personalization in a Dynamic Model
- Network Investments Under Different Consumer Expectations and Competition Modes
- Pricing and Selection of Second-Degree Price Discrimination Menus