Abstract
Return migration and pension benefits are crucial for ageing migrants whose migration project takes a significant turn due to circumstances in the receiving country. A significant number of migrants have recently returned to Albania from Greece due to the financial crisis and are struggling to start a new life. A number of those remaining in Greece wish to retire upon return to Albania, or prefer to remain in Greece if they manage to retire there. Problems arise because of the lack of portability of social security benefits from Greece to Albania. This article looks at the policy and legal frameworks of migration and the national social security system, aiming to identify the existing gaps in the policy and legislative configurations of the two countries. It appears that significant policy inconsistencies and gaps have serious implications for ageing returned migrants and also for those remaining in the host country (Greece), indicating an urgent need to address these difficulties at a transnational policy level.
Introduction
Literature on migration largely focuses on the ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors of the country of origin and host country from the perspective of young adults that participate and are active in the labour market. [1] Return migration has come to the attention of scholars fairly recently, and has been closely related to an unsuccessful migration plan, the exploring of new opportunities in the home country, or retirement in later life. [2] Only in recent studies has the link between (return) migration and social protection gained attention, though international organizations in the field of migration tackled issues linked to social protection, social security and benefits much earlier. [3] It is therefore necessary to focus on social security benefits, not least because new studies link return in later life with psychosocial issues connected to the experiences of migrants in the transnational plane encompassing their country of origin and country of immigration. [4]
Increasing international labour mobility has triggered the discussion of issues linked to social security benefits for migrant workers. Rachel Sabates-Wheeler, Johannes Koettl, and Johanna Avato have identified four components of social protection for international migrants, namely, access to social security in the host and origin countries, portability between host and origin countries in order to avoid the loss of accrued entitlements, specific labour market conditions, and access to informal networks. [5] However, given the atypical lifecycle of migrant workers, they require special provisions with regard to various forms of social security and access to social services. [6]
King et al. recently investigated the state of research on the nexus between ageing and migration, and presented six categories within this configuration: older people left behind by migration, older migrants joining their families, affluent international retirement migrants, older economic migrants (mainly from eastern Europe who migrated for the first time in their fifties or sixties as labour migrants), older return migrants, and ageing-in-place migrants. [7] The later category is composed of migrants who migrated during the post-war period to the industrial economies of north-western Europe and are beyond retirement age, but are facing health care and welfare challenges. The most commonly studied form of retiree migration is the return migration of former labour migrants to their previous home countries or home regions. [8] In academic discourse, the term ‘retirement migration’, or sometimes ‘international retirement migration’ (IRM), primarily refers to amenity-oriented migration among retired persons from western countries who move, permanently or temporarily, to a new home location in search of a better quality of life. [9] On the other hand, many labour migrants desire to return to their home country upon retirement. According to Christian Dustmann, Samuel Bentolila, and Riccardo Faini, the desire to return increases with the age of entry into the host country, but then tends to decrease with the length of stay. [10] Regarding the life cycle of migrants, retirement frequently acts as a key temporal juncture for rethinking a potential return. [11]
Despite the vast literature on migration, studies have not yet emphasized the case of ageing migrants who have worked in host countries (in this case Greece, or elsewhere) for a considerable part of their lives and are now returning to their home country (Albania). Recent studies on return migration to Albania are oblivious of the issue of ageing migrants and their pensions, as the focus has been on the contribution of returnees to Albania’s development. [12] In fact, these migrants face a not very ‘safe’ future in their potential retirement, and uncertain chances of a pension and other social security benefits. Like the ‘older return migrants’ in King’s typology, they are partly invisible, since they do not belong to any of the ‘typical’ vulnerable groups, such as children, women, the disabled or the frail elderly. These ageing migrants are in a precarious situation due to the lack of a bilateral agreement on the portability of social security benefits between Greece and Albania.
Although Lois Labrianidis and Antigoni Lyberaki published an optimistic study on Albanian return migrants, they were writing in the early 2000s and ageing was not yet a pressing issue among Albanian migrants. Return was more voluntary and less intense than has been the case for the recent waves of workers ‘forced out’ by the economic crisis. [13] Furthermore, later studies have shown that returnees not participating in the labour market have returned because of failing their initial migration target, due to family reasons or because they were circular/seasonal migrants. [14]
Thus, for ageing migrants residing in the host country or who have decided to return to their country of origin, the issue of the portability of benefits has become of crucial importance. [15] According to Nurulsyahirah Taha et al., portability is ‘the ability of migrant workers to preserve, maintain, and transfer benefits from a social security programme from one country to another and between localities in a country (spatial portability), between jobs’. [16] If the legislation of the host country or bilateral agreements between the host and home countries do not include provisions allowing migrant workers to keep their social security entitlements, they will lose a substantial amount of the income earned while working in the host country.
The absence of the portability of benefits is even considered a barrier to return migration. [17] Previous research on the issue has shown that migrants in Greece were motivated to pay for social security contributions in order to gain or renew their residence permits, but in the midst of the economic crisis, this has proven hard for them. [18] Other research has shown that in host countries with relatively short immigration histories—like Greece—the decision to return to the country of origin has been based on the character of national policies, which in Greece have been reactive and precautionary making the acceptance, legalisation and social inclusion of migrants difficult. [19]
This article investigates the situation of ageing Albanian migrants in Greece and those returning to Albania after the financial crisis, looking at the legal and policy provisions that regulate their social security benefits and pension contributions. Many Albanian migrants previously employed in different sectors in Greece have lost their jobs and been obliged by circumstances to return to their country of origin and face a new challenging reality. [20] Starting in the early 1990s, Albanian migrants went to Greece and other countries at an active economic age to find jobs. They stayed there for approximately twenty to twenty-five years and are now approaching retirement. Their pension contributions in Greece are not always enough to qualify for a pension there, while the pension they are entitled to in Albania is quite insufficient to sustain them. Additionally, some migrants are at risk of losing their accrued entitlements, in some cases even on the verge of losing a basic pension. Ensuring a pension is one of the most important issues for the Albanian community in Greece, particularly for those who emigrated in the 1990s. [21] Research on migration and return from Italy shows similar patterns. [22]
Thus, Albanian returned migrants who worked mainly in low-skill sectors such as farming, construction etc., particularly those who migrated to Greece, now face another major challenge: having to spend the rest of their lives in their homeland as returned migrants and nationals without a pension or, at best, with a very low social pension from the age of 70. [23] Those who decide to remain in Greece must cope with the fact that their social security benefits from the years that they worked in Albania or were informally employed in Greece will not be included in their final pension. [24] According to the Albanian Institute of Statistics (INSTAT), almost one in five returned migrants is above fifty years old, and therefore close to retirement age. [25]
For the purposes of this study, secondary data was collected and analysed. In terms of method, the authors reviewed and analysed policy documents related to migration and social security in both Greece and Albania, with a main emphasis on the portability of social security benefits and pensions. In the following sections, analysis is focused on the challenges faced by a considerable number of Albanian migrants regarding the portability of benefits and social security contributions in general, how the later link with work permits, and the implications for pension rights.
The Albania–Greece Migration Corridor
As in the rest of southern Europe, massive immigration is recent in Greece and dates to the early 1990s. Since then, Greece has been a major receiving country for migrants from former communist countries, including Albania. However, Greece was one of the last European countries to regulate immigration. [26] By the mid-1990s, when the inflow of migrants reached its peak, Greece was characterized by large numbers of immigrants without the necessary legal documents.
In the beginning of the 1990s, the majority of Albanian migrants entered Greece following irregular migratory pathways, mainly crossing the mountainous Greek–Albanian border on foot. [27] The second outflow of Albanian migrants heading to Greece was between 1997 and 1998, when there was civil unrest in Albania and an unstable political situation. In the first decade of the 2000s, many Albanians continued to migrate to Greece. The highly irregular migratory movements of Albanians into Greece throughout the early 1990s were temporary and circular, involving semi-skilled, low-skilled, or unskilled male migrants. [28] It was only in the early 2000s that most of these irregular migratory movements and employment arrangements evolved into permanent family settlement. [29]
The majority of migrants in Greece were employed informally, mostly as domestic workers (women migrants) and as construction or agricultural workers (men migrants), and were not insured by state insurance organizations. [30] Access to various forms of social security was denied to the immigrant workforce on the basis of both the undocumented immigration status and non-registered employment status of the migrants. [31] Although clear evidence is lacking, even in the case of the insured workforce, there was a sense that the relationship between immigrant workers and social insurance agencies was problematic. [32] According to Thanos Maroukis, the newcomer migrants, who had limited social capital in Greece or were undocumented, served as a main pool of cheap labour for temporary employment agencies (TEA). [33] Based on evidence presented in the same article, the author argues that the activities of these agencies border on human trafficking. Their flourishing is related to the malfunctioning of the Greek migration policy regime during the 1990s and early 2000s.
According to 2011 national census data, 713,000 third country nationals and 199,000 European Union (EU, non-Greek) citizens lived in Greece, amounting to 6.5% and 1.8% respectively of the total resident population. Albanians constituted the largest immigrant group (480,000). [34]
Citing sources compiled by the Hellenic Ministry of the Interior, Eda Gemi notes that around 130,000 to 140,000 Albanian migrant workers lost their Greek residence permits due to the financial crisis, since they were unable to secure the required number of social security stamps, the so-called ‘Social Security Institution stamps’ (Ιδρυμα Κοινωνικων Ασφαλισεων, IKA). [35] She points out that ‘it is extremely difficult to assess whether all of them settled in Albania, eventually returned again to Greece or migrated to other countries with more robust economies’. [36] Data from Albania tends to confirm that there was a flow of returned migrants. A national study conducted in Albania by INSTAT reports that the total number of returnees for the period 2009 to 2013 was 133,544, of which 30,005 were above 50 years old. [37]
Circular migration to Greece continues, although this legal flow is now routed through land border crossing points due to visa-free travel granted to Albania in 2010. [38] In the early 2000s, the main destination country for circular migrants was Greece. [39] Today, returned migrants to Albania face challenges in connection with their reintegration, particularly in terms of employment and education as well as the reintegration of their children. [40]
Regularization of Labour Migration and Integration of Albanian Migrants in Greece
The immigrant population in Greece is comprised of individuals with varied legal status. Legalization procedures for those who arrived illegally and worked informally in Greece started in the late 1990s. During the first regularization attempt of 1998, migrants were granted an initial six-month white card that was a prerequisite for a green card application. In order to qualify for a green card, an immigrant had to prove legal employment starting from January 1998 and would have to be employed for at least forty days at the minimum wage. [41] Based on official data, 371,641 foreigners applied for a white card in Greece during the regularization programme of 1998, and 241,561 were granted permits (65% of total applicants were Albanians). [42]
The next law on migration was passed by the Greek Parliament in 2001— about a decade after massive immigration to Greece had started—and included both migration management and migrant integration measures. [43] The law on the ‘Entry and sojourn of foreigners on Greek territory, naturalization and other measures’ was introduced in 2001. This programme initially granted a six-month residence permit that was later to be replaced by a work and residence permit. During the regularization programme of 2001, 228,000 out of the 368,000 undocumented immigrants who applied were granted permits. At the same time, an action plan for the social integration of immigrants was introduced (‘Action Plan for the Social Integration of Immigrants for the Period 2002-2005’). This plan included access to health services, the promotion of cultural interaction, and the fight against xenophobia and racism. Its implementation proved challenging for Greece during a period when a large part of the state budget was allocated to the Olympic Games. [44]
In 2005, there was a new effort to manage migration through a new law, focused on simplifying the management (issue and renewal) of residence permits. This law for the first time included the ‘social integration’ of third country nationals in Greece, which was considered a shift in the approach towards migration. Yet it did not significantly alter the reactive approach of the previous laws. Later amendments of the 2005 law were intended to facilitate the procedures for the renewal of residence permits, particularly for migrants who had lost their legal status because they could not prove that they were employed by showing enough social insurance stamps. [45]
Another law was passed in 2010, primarily focusing on the preconditions for the naturalization of migrants, and also somewhat improving the prospects of integration, but it went largely unimplemented. Inevitably, in 2011-2013, in the midst of the crisis, the integration of migrants into the labour market was further worsened by economic depression and unemployment. As for social integration, this was never a strong point of Greek migration policy. Some authors argue that the case of Albanians, Bulgarians and Romanians, who are thought to constitute half of all migrants and first came to Greece after the fall of communism in Southeast Europe, forms an exception. Others support the idea that all immigrants in Greece face problems with social insurance. In the midst of the financial crisis, Greek nationals also faced similar issues, but the migrant population was the most affected. [46]
During the financial crisis, a large proportion of the Albanian migrants in Greece decided to return to Albania. In 2013, 22% of the total number of returnees was above 50 years old, while the average age of migrants returning home was 38.6 years. [47] Data published by IKA shows that the number of Albanian nationals insured in 2009 reached 121,902, while by the end of 2013 the figure had decreased to 85,893. The greatest drop was observed in the construction sector, where just a third of those insured in 2009 were still registered, since construction was the sector most affected by the financial crisis. [48] The majority of Albanian migrants in Greece were employed in seasonal employment, construction, farming and tourism. [49]
In their 2010 analysis of return migration and occupational choice, Matloob Piracha and Florin Vadean present a number of arguments to explain migrants’ decisions to return, including location preferences, purchasing power and more favourable returns on accumulated capital in the home country, as well as the failure to achieve initial migration targets (e.g. not finding a job or the expected job). [50] The later seems to have been the major driving force for return to Albania after the financial crisis in Greece and Italy. [51] This trend is in line with the neoclassical economic framework casting returnees as ‘failed’ migrants. [52]
In 2011, employment without social insurance (undeclared work) in Greece reached 30%. Social security funds suffered losses of € 4 billion. [53] Groups at high risk of working in precarious arrangements included women, young people under the age of thirty, migrants working in the informal sector, and more recently, men in the 35-50 age group. Sectors associated with precarious work included construction, tourism and services, home delivery, cleaning, catering and private security services, and the public sector (public administration, public enterprises and other public entities). Migrants worked mostly in these areas. [54] Once again, migrants were faced with significant difficulties in paying social security contributions, with the result that working time will be omitted from their final pensions.
A new Migration Code was adopted in Greece in April 2014. [55] The new code, just like the previous migration laws, regulates matters of entry, residence and the social integration of third country nationals, integrating previous laws and bringing Greek legislation fully in line with EU law. EU citizens, refugees and asylum seekers are excluded from its area of application, indicating that labour and other types of migrants from non-EU countries (students, trainees, researchers, highly skilled workers), such as Albanians, were its main focus. The Migration Code aims to simplify and organize the different types of residence permit into six categories: residence permits issued for work or professional reasons; temporary residence permits issued for humanitarian or exceptional reasons; residence permits for study, training or voluntary work; residence permits for victims of trafficking or human smuggling; residence permits for family reunification, and residence permits of long duration. The code transposes into national law the relevant EU directives on family reunification, migration for study or vocational training, the migration of researchers, the Blue Card directive, and so on. It streamlines to some extent the processing of long-term residence permits, although these probably remain more difficult to acquire in comparison to the national ten-year permit given to third country nationals living legally in Greece for the previous ten years (before the ten-year permit, documents were issued on a two-year basis). [56] Last but not least, the Migration Code seeks to streamline the management of permits and labour and insurance issues for seasonal migrants working in agriculture or fisheries. Both areas consist of established forms of seasonal migration from neighbouring countries (Egypt in connection with the fishing industry; Albania and other Balkan countries in connection with agricultural work).
As shown in Table 1, the past few years have seen an increase in the number of residence permits granted to Albanian nationals, particularly after the new Migration Code of 2014 came into force. Of the total number of permits, a staggering 78% were issued to Albanian migrants, which can be read as a positive indicator for the future. However, obtaining a permit caused significant financial cost as migrants had to pay for their insurance at a time of crisis, which had implications both for their welfare in Greece and their intentions and plans to return. [57]
Number of residence permits.
| Year | Albania | Total |
|---|---|---|
| 2014 | 312,224 | N/A |
| 2015 | 354,480 | 515,242 |
| 2016 | 383,522 | 552,748 |
Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs, Στατιστικά στοιχεία για τη νόμιμη μετανάστευση (Statistical Data on Legal Migration in Greece), Athens 2016, http://www.immigration.gov.gr/web/guest/miniaia-statistika-stoixeia
As Efstratios Loizou, Anastasios Michailidis and Anastasios Karasavvoglou underline, Greek migration policies have focused mainly on controlling borders and deporting illegal migrants. [58] Their character has been mainly short-term and without precautionary measures—a policy deficiency that has made the acceptance, legalization and social inclusion of immigrants difficult. Additionally, the host society faces immigrants with racism and exclusion. The lack of an integrated migration policy that would include return migration is a factor that induced, either directly or indirectly, a significant number of Albanian immigrants to return home. The issue of the portability of social security contributions arises more prominently for migrants approaching retirement age. On the Albanian side, emigration has been treated mainly as a means to export unemployment problems and import financial remittances. Therefore, there were no major strategic initiatives in this direction until the return migration flow of 2009 to 2013 from Greece and Italy. [59]
The Greek Financial Crisis and Social Security Challenges
The Greek economy has been in continuous recession since 2008. Between December 2008 and December 2012, GDP decreased by 20.4% and employment fell by 18.5%. [60] According to a press release issued by the Hellenic Statistical Institute, unemployment rose to 27.2% in 2013 versus 21.5% in January 2012 and 25.7% in December 2012. This rate fell back to under 20% for the first time in 2018. It is the highest rate among the EU-28. [61] Based on data from the Hellenic Social Insurance Institution ΙΚΑ-ΕΤΑΜ, 40.5% of employees are uninsured, while 52% of businesses in Greece employ uninsured or undeclared staff. [62]
Economic and financial crises tend to make pension reforms inevitable. [63] The Greek pension system is a pay-as-you-go corporatist system, based on a multitude of occupational pension funds. Between 1990 and 2010, there were repeated failed attempts to reform the pension system in order to stabilize the rising pension expenditures that threatened to derail fiscal policy. [64] Overall, changes in the pension system have had a positive impact with regard to the country’s fiscal problems. Nevertheless, it is speculated that the most affected by the crisis are migrants living in Greece or those leaving it. [65] Migrants resident in Greece for lengthy periods have lacked access to social security benefits due to their illegal status, the circularity of migration, or the informality of their employment. Even those with some years of insured employment cannot transfer benefits to Albania. At the same time, they cannot transfer the insured working years they collected prior to migrating from Albania to Greece, in order to fulfil the criteria for a pension in Greece.
As the result of a pension reform in 2013, since January of that year the pension age in Greece has been 67 for both men and women with at least 4,500 days of contribution (equivalent to 15 years). As of January 2015, a basic pension has been granted by all social security organizations provided that the beneficiary is 67 years old, has had permanent residence in Greece for at least 15 years, and fulfils income criteria. [66] However, the different pension reforms, the phasing out of early retirement schemes and the tightening of eligibility criteria for other social transfer programmes that operated as de facto early retirement schemes, have affected retirement decisions. [67]
The Social Security System in Albania
In Albania, the first pension regulations date back to 1947 as part of the first insurance system established in the country. [68] The system was further shaped under the influence of the soviet model. Its implementation during the communist regime and centralised economy led to a positive ratio of 100 employees per 27 retirees in 1989. [69] Pensions in postcommunist and transitional Albania have been largely defined by the 1993 law on pensions, which set the maximum pension benefit as the double of the fixed pension or 75% of the average income of the insured in three consecutive years in the last ten-year period of employment, depending on which of these values was lower. [70] Since then, the pension system has been faced with several challenges and problems threatening its sustainability and has become a huge burden for the state budget. As a result, the legal framework in this respect has been subject to continuous change. [71] The most recent reform of the pension system was planned in 2014 and its implementation began in 2015 with the support of the World Bank. [72]
Currently, the pension system in Albania consists of two main components. The first corresponds to what is internationally known as the first tier, or pillar, and is the mandatory state fund. The second pillar—the voluntary private pillar—is the second component of the Albanian system and consists of insurance companies offering supplementary private pensions; in international terms, this corresponds to the third pension system tier. [73] Benefits are calculated according to a specific formula based on the number of working years, wages earned, as well as the contributions paid. [74] The first pillar continues to be troubled by a low net replacement rate, a high dependency rate, and a considerable level of evasion of contributions payment. The third pillar, though new and modest in Albania, has increased significantly in the last years. Most recent legal provisions have paid attention to more vulnerable categories excluded in the past, such as the self-employed and unpaid domestic workers (a large number of whom include returned migrants). Normative Act no. 1, dated 25 January 2017, defines the national minimum wage as the basis for social security contribution for these two categories. [75]
Current Challenges Faced by Albanian (Returned) Migrants Close to Retirement Age
Studies on return migration among middle-aged and older adults show that age significantly increases the risk of return for immigrants aged 50 and older, and decreases the desire to return for immigrants over 45 years old. [76] Certain resources may be more influential in shaping return among those who are ‘younger’ than those who are ‘older’, even within the population aged 50 and over. Jenjira Yahirun suggests that certain labour market characteristics, such as wages and unemployment trends, could shape the return decisions of older adults still tied to the labour force. [77]
An important element of reintegration assistance commonly offered to returnees by countries of origin covers access to social protection benefits, including health, counselling, social security and education. A specific aspect of social protection concerns the pension and social security rights of returnees. In most countries, returnees enjoy the same social rights as other citizens, but an issue of utmost importance to returnees is the extent to which their social security and pension payments in the host country are transferable. In this respect, the Albania–Turkey agreement, operational since 2003, is a positive example of how the transfer of payments can work in reality. Another recent agreement in this area is that between Albania and Luxembourg, from which a total 3,500 Albanian migrants will eventually benefit. [78]
Although Albania has developed a policy framework on migration, diaspora and return, the coherence of this policy could have been much more effective. [79] The same could be said of its implementation. [80] The lack of coordination among the institutions involved, political unwillingness to implement the ‘previous government’s measures’ and changes over the years in the structure of government, are issues that were highlighted early in the process. [81] Diaspora policy has been ineffective largely because of a lack of appreciation of the role of migrants in the development of Albania. [82] Meanwhile, in the three main host countries—Greece, Italy, and the UK—there is a shared feeling among Albanian migrants that the Albanian state has done very little for them. [83] In short, the policy framework has been driven by pressures on an international level, but that do not necessarily correlate with the priorities of migrants. Moreover, due to gaps and inconsistencies in overall policy development, the government’s unwillingness to tackle certain issues (e.g. voting rights) and the poor bargaining power of the Albanian government at an international level, the process of implementation has been largely ineffective.
As a result of fragmented and deficient policies both in Greece and in their country of origin, a large number of Albanian and other migrants are at serious risk of losing their social security benefits from their years of work in Greece. According to the new Greek law on social insurance, a foreign citizen can benefit from a joint pension in Greece only if there is a bilateral agreement between the two countries. In addition, in order for a migrant to have a basic minimum pension in Greece, he or she must have been permanently and legally resident in the country for the last fifteen years before retirement and have at least fifteen insured years of work. Subsequently, at the age of 70, a migrant can benefit from a minimum pension, after declaring that he or she does not receive a pension from another country.
Based on these criteria, the vast majority of migrants face many challenges in qualifying for a minimum pension, because many did not register as legal residents due to the difficulties of gaining a work permit in Greece. Even migrants who paid their social contributions for many years are at risk of losing them and ending up without any pension. [84] As a last resort, migrants may be able to draw a social pension in Albania or the basic pension in Greece, though neither would reflect their actual years of work. The majority of Albanian migrants entered Greece for the first time in 1991, and only started paying for social insurance in 1998 when the legalization process started, not least because they were obliged to do so in order to obtain a legal work permit. The vast majority started paying for social insurance in early 2000, when the second massive legalization process started.
Therefore, some Albanian migrants have not accumulated the fourteen to fifteen legal working years in Greece covered by social insurance. Crisis has raised the unemployment rate in Greece and many Albanians cannot afford to register legally in Greece if they are not employed. On the other hand, for many returning to Albania, return is a short-term option in order to benefit from the lower cost of living. Indeed, this short-term return puts them at higher risk in terms of their pension benefits and possibility for retirement. [85] In January 2015, the total number of Albanian nationals receiving a pension in Greece was 3,175; although Albanians comprise two thirds of migrants in Greece (67%), they are underrepresented in the total number of pensions. [86] Only 25% of the total pensions for non-nationals go to Albanians (see Table 2). Furthermore, statistical data from the Hellenic Ministry of the Interior (MoI) on residence permits issued up to March 2016 indicates that the total number of Albanian migrants living in Greece above the age of 65 was 4,553, which is higher than the total 3,175 receiving pensions. The total number of migrants close to retirement age or above 60 years old was 14,504. [87]
Pensions of Albanians and others in Greece, 2016.
| Nationality | Number of pensions |
|---|---|
| Greek nationals | 4,513,632 |
| Albanians | 3,175 |
| Other nationalities | 9,365 |
| Total | 4,526,172 |
Source: Ministry of Labour, Social Security and Social Solidarity, Mηνιαια απεικονιση συνταξιοδοτικων παροχων & προνοιακων επιδοματων εκθεση 20η (20th Monthly Report on Pensions and Benefits in Greece), Athens 2015, http://www.idika.gr/files/20%CE%B7_%CE%B5%CE%BA%CE%B8%CE%B5%CF%83%CE%B7_%CE%97%CE%9B%CE%99%CE%9F%CE%A3_.pdf
Two particularly vulnerable categories are those of female domestic workers and circular migrants. Women domestic workers, who constitute the majority among female Albanian migrants in Greece, are largely not registered in any insurance scheme. This category faces bigger difficulties with regard to social security and pensions. [88] Looking at the options available to these women migrants under the existing statutory social insurance system, one must conclude that they are limited. A large segment of the above population is cut of from the welfare system due to unauthorized entry and stay in the country, while those who obtained all the necessary documents for residence and employment have too low a volume of income for the social insurance contributions that would usually qualify them for a pension or income subsidies such as health, child care, etc. Furthermore, informal hiring practices, temporary employment and work sharing between different employers, subcontracting and the substantial difficulties workers have in understanding bureaucratic regulations, make matters worse. [89] For example, Maroukis argues that the labour pool accessed by temporary employment agencies in Greece has traditionally consisted of newcomer migrants with limited social capital in Greece or who are undocumented. These agencies have exercised a strict and exploitative form of control, resulting from the restrictive and malfunctioning migration policy regime that for more than two decades offered migrants more pathways out of legality than into it. [90] Nikos Xypolytas, Katerina Vassilikou, and Theodoros Fouskas have established that for many domestic workers in Greece, getting a pension from Greece is at present more of an imaginary prospect than a reality. The majority of employers in Greece have not registered them in the social security system, and the years spent working in Greece do not quite meet the requirements for obtaining a pension. Sustaining themselves on the basis of a pension from their country of origin, if they could earn one, would be nearly impossible. [91]
The main advantage for circular migrants currently working under the seasonal work scheme in agriculture (this also applies to other types of circular migrants) has been that they have earned a living all these years and been able to sustain their family back home (e.g. to build houses or invest in the family farm). Their biggest problem is that they cannot make use of their health insurance payments in the host country even though positive steps have been taken in this direction by the Social Security Agency for farmers in Greece (OGA). [92] Secondly, they do not have the option to pay in pension contributions for the half of their working lives spent in Greece. The main issues for circular migrants, particularly those in the construction and service sectors, regardless of the type of visa they hold (a work permit for two years or a seasonal or short-term residence permit), are the long-standing structural difficulties in collecting the required number of social insurance stamps for the renewal of their permits—aggravated by the crisis-related increase of unemployment and undeclared work—and whether they will ever be entitled to claim a part of their pension from the Greek state should they retire back to their country of origin. [93] Since a high number of Albanians, especially those originating from areas neighbouring Greece, worked in agriculture and a high number have remained seasonal workers, this particular category may pose a significant challenge in the case of Albanian migrants.
The lack of portability of long-term social security benefits might even hinder return migration per se, thus putting migrants living in the host country in a vulnerable situation up to retirement age and even longer. After paying contributions to the social security system of the host country for several years, many migrants may well be influenced by the potential loss of these contributions with regard to their return decision. Meanwhile, at international level, a number of migrant sending and receiving countries have negotiated bilateral social security agreements to enhance cooperation between the social security authorities of the countries involved and to ensure the adequate portability of the contributions and entitlements of migrant workers and their families. [94]
Conclusions and Recommendations
This study has looked at the lack of portability of social security contributions and the implications for ageing migrants returning to Albania from Greece. Emma Lundholm underlines that most literature on return migration among the elderly has focused on international migration and the event of labour migrants returning to their country of origin upon retirement. [95] Retired people do not have to make migration decisions based on the conditions of the labour market, and hence the motives and destinations of retired migrants (or those approaching retirement) differ from those of other groups, putting emphasis on family bonds and quality of life. [96] In contrast, the driving force for ageing Albanian migrants and their decision to return is frequently tied to their vulnerable situation in Greece due to unemployment and the lack of portability of social security benefits, among other issues. [97]
The financial crisis in Greece has had a major impact on the everyday life of both Greek nationals and migrants. Many migrants have left Greece to return to their homelands, including Albania. Almost one out of five returned migrants to Albania is above 50 years old, and therefore close to retirement age. [98] Their years spent working in Greece, if counted separately from those in Albania, do not fulfil the criteria for a pension. Albania has already signed bilateral pension agreements with Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany and Turkey. However, the major concern is to reach agreement with Italy and Greece, due to the large number of Albanians living there and the large percentages of returnees from these two countries. Currently, bilateral agreements appear to be the best mode of ensuring the portability of pension and health care benefits, although for the later this is not always the case. [99]
The remittances that move from Greece towards Albania with the transfer of migrants’ savings upon relocation to Albania cannot, and should not, replace the obligations of the two states to provide pensions to migrant workers. The possibility of a joint pension will be created only if the two countries sign a bilateral agreement. In that case, migrants in situations similar to those described above would benefit from a pension based on contributions paid in both countries, rather than none, as is now the case for many returning ageing migrants. Each state would have to provide benefits based on the respective contributions made by a migrant in different periods. Greece, in particular, is one of the most challenging countries in terms of pension benefits, because a migrant is required to complete at least 4,500 working days in the last 15 years.
In relation to circular migration, we recommend that policymakers in Greece initiate the registration of pension rights in the workers’ records held by the Hellenic Ministry of Interior. The pension contributions should be paid directly (a higher percentage) by the migrant and indirectly (a lower percentage) after the equivalent reduction of the tax return sum he or she receives from the employer, to counterbalance the negative effect of the growth of informal work to a certain extent. [100] Considering the centrality of Greece in the region as one of the main receiving countries for migrants from the former socialist countries in southern and eastern Europe, and the enormous importance of migration as a livelihood strategy for these migrants and their countries of origin, it is important that more research and policymaking efforts take place in this area.
As Robert Holzmann and Johannes Koettl elaborate, decisions on international mobility should not be influenced by the lack of portability of social benefits for which migrants have acquired rights. [101] Social policy considers portability a crucial component of life cycle planning and social risk management, while from a human rights perspective each individual has the right to social protection, guaranteed by national legislation and international conventions. Transnational arrangements ought to be put in place for such principles to materialize for ageing migrants.
© 2019 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Social policies, demographic patterns, and inclusion strategies
- Social Policies, Demographic Patterns, and Inclusion Strategies. An Introduction
- Silent Non-Exit and Broken Voice. Early Postcommunist Social Policies as Protest-Preempting Strategies
- The State Policy towards the Homeless in Moldova between the ‘Left Hand’ and the ‘Right Hand’. The Case of Chișinău Shelter
- Generational and Intergenerational Care and Mobility Networks in Kosovo
- Precarious Retirement for Ageing Albanian (Return) Migrants
- Starting Early with Language Learning. Enhancing Human Capital and Improving the Integration of Migrant Families in the Danube Region. Examples from Bavaria
- Spotlight
- Electronic Democracy in Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. Patterns and Comparative Perspectives
- Book Reviews
- Nostalgia, Loss and Creativity in Southeast Europe. Political and Cultural Representations of the Past
- ‘Den Balkan gibt es nicht’. Erbschaften im südöstlichen Europa
- Mehrsprachigkeit in der Republik Moldau aus autobiographischer Perspektive
- Migrating Borders and Moving Times. Temporality and the Crossing of Borders in Europe
- Everyday Life in the Balkans
Artikel in diesem Heft
- Frontmatter
- Social policies, demographic patterns, and inclusion strategies
- Social Policies, Demographic Patterns, and Inclusion Strategies. An Introduction
- Silent Non-Exit and Broken Voice. Early Postcommunist Social Policies as Protest-Preempting Strategies
- The State Policy towards the Homeless in Moldova between the ‘Left Hand’ and the ‘Right Hand’. The Case of Chișinău Shelter
- Generational and Intergenerational Care and Mobility Networks in Kosovo
- Precarious Retirement for Ageing Albanian (Return) Migrants
- Starting Early with Language Learning. Enhancing Human Capital and Improving the Integration of Migrant Families in the Danube Region. Examples from Bavaria
- Spotlight
- Electronic Democracy in Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine. Patterns and Comparative Perspectives
- Book Reviews
- Nostalgia, Loss and Creativity in Southeast Europe. Political and Cultural Representations of the Past
- ‘Den Balkan gibt es nicht’. Erbschaften im südöstlichen Europa
- Mehrsprachigkeit in der Republik Moldau aus autobiographischer Perspektive
- Migrating Borders and Moving Times. Temporality and the Crossing of Borders in Europe
- Everyday Life in the Balkans