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4. Getting In: Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet Decision to Invade Afghanistan
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Michael R. Fenzel
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Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter i
- Contents vii
- Acknowledgments viii
- List of Abbreviations x
- 1. Introduction 1
- 2. The Soviet Failure in Afghanistan 5
- 3. Setting the Stage: Evolution of Party-military Relations 11
- 4. Getting In: Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet Decision to Invade Afghanistan 29
- 5. No Retreat . . . No Miracles: Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko in Afghanistan (1980–85) 58
- 6. Gorbachev’s Quest for “Reluctant, Silent Agreement” to Withdraw from Afghanistan (1985) 87
- 7. Getting Out: Gorbachev and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (1986–89) 96
- 8. Losing Afghanistan 119
- Appendix: Soviet Stakeholder Agencies 137
- Notes 141
- Refererences 163
- Index 171
Kapitel in diesem Buch
- Frontmatter i
- Contents vii
- Acknowledgments viii
- List of Abbreviations x
- 1. Introduction 1
- 2. The Soviet Failure in Afghanistan 5
- 3. Setting the Stage: Evolution of Party-military Relations 11
- 4. Getting In: Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet Decision to Invade Afghanistan 29
- 5. No Retreat . . . No Miracles: Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko in Afghanistan (1980–85) 58
- 6. Gorbachev’s Quest for “Reluctant, Silent Agreement” to Withdraw from Afghanistan (1985) 87
- 7. Getting Out: Gorbachev and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (1986–89) 96
- 8. Losing Afghanistan 119
- Appendix: Soviet Stakeholder Agencies 137
- Notes 141
- Refererences 163
- Index 171